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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 34 of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013). It covers major developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since my report of 28 June 2013 (S/2013/388), including with regard to the implementation of national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region; progress made by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in the implementation of its mandate; and the implications of MONUSCO operations against armed groups for the safety and security of United Nations personnel and facilities. It also provides an update on the reconfiguration of MONUSCO and the development of the road map for the transfer of activities to the United Nations country team.

II. Major developments

Political developments

2. On 7 September, President Joseph Kabila opened a national dialogue, stressing that it would help foster internal cohesion in order to overcome external aggression, reinforce State authority throughout the country, end the cycle of violence in the east and pave the way for lasting peace and development.

3. In accordance with the presidential decree of 26 June 2013, preparations had been made to establish the framework for such a dialogue among Congolese stakeholders. In reaction to the decree, opposition parliamentary groups issued a joint statement on 1 July denouncing the exclusion of key stakeholders in the preparatory phase. Their concerns were reiterated in a communiqué issued on 11 July by another group of opposition parties, which proposed alternatives to the announced framework and called for a regional mediation and the involvement of members of the international community. On 4 July, the Minister for Communications and government spokesperson, Lambert Mende, rejected the calls of the opposition for an international mediation of the dialogue, while on 20 July a large segment of civil society confirmed its participation

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4. On 7 August, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Congo was approached by the presidium of the national dialogue, chaired by National Assembly Speaker Aubin Minaku and Senate President Léon Kengo Wa Dondo, and agreed in principle to facilitate the process. On 10 August, in response to calls for a more inclusive process, a mixed "contact group" was created by the presidium to develop the internal rules of procedure and agenda of the dialogue. While two of the opposition parliamentary groups, the Libéraux (affiliated with Senate President Kengo Wa Dondo) and the Mouvement de libération du Congo, joined in these preparations and committed themselves to participating in the national dialogue, the two largest parliamentary opposition groups, the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social and its allies and the Union pour la nation congolaise, refused to participate.

5. On 25 July, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued international warrants of arrest and extradition requests to the Government of Rwanda for four leaders of the Mouvement du 23 mars (M23), wanted on charges of having established an insurrectional movement and of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. The individuals in question, who had sought refuge in Rwanda on 16 March, are Baudouin Ngaruye, Eric Badege, Innocent Zimurinda and Jean-Marie Runiga.

Progress on the implementation of national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Agreement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region

Security sector reform

6. Efforts to enhance the capacity of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo-FARDC), including through the establishment of a rapid reaction force, continued. During the period under review, the rehabilitation of the tactical training centre for the training of three infantry battalions for the rapid reaction force was completed and Congolese armed forces instructors were selected.

7. On 8 July, President Kabila signed a decree on the promotion and retirement of over 100 officers of the Congolese armed forces, indicating progress in the development of a Government policy for military personnel in support of army reform.

Consolidation of State authority

8. Efforts continued to be made to restore and consolidate Government authority in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo with MONUSCO support. The feasibility study for the rehabilitation of the Hombo-Masisi road through Walikale, in North Kivu, was completed by the national road agency and MONUSCO on 19 July. In South Kivu, the Government and international partners continued to work on a joint initiative, launched in June 2013, to assess and improve the quality of basic services provided to the population.

Decentralization

9. As part of a three-month national sensitization campaign on the decentralization process, a first meeting was held in Matadi on 31 July and

1 August. Additional meetings, focusing on the management of decentralized territorial entities, were held in all provincial capitals.

Structural reforms of government institutions, including financial reforms

10. Efforts to reform the financial regulatory authorities continued. In September, the Ministry of Finance started to revise the draft decree on financial administration reform, as recommended by the Prime Minister, Augustin Matata Ponyo. The draft decree provides for important changes to the internal structure of the Ministry, including the creation of a new directorate-general of the treasury and an audit department.

Reconciliation, tolerance and democratization

11. There was progress in reviving the electoral process. On 10 July, the first meeting of the Election Partnership Committee since April 2012 was held in Kinshasa. During the meeting, the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Abbot Apollinaire Malu Malu, reaffirmed that institution's commitment to hold local elections in 2014. On 23 July, President Kabila presided over a meeting confirming the intent of the Government to organize provincial and local elections as soon as possible.

12. On 31 July, I received a letter from the Government requesting the continuation of electoral technical assistance by the United Nations for the upcoming provincial and local elections, as well as the general elections. On 25 September, I dispatched an electoral needs assessment mission to evaluate the situation and develop recommendations in that regard.

Situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

13. The situation in North Kivu further deteriorated after M23 first launched an attack, on 14 July, against the Congolese armed forces. The Congolese army repelled the offensive and gained ground towards Kibumba, 30 km north of Goma. On 16 July, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Rwanda addressed a letter to MONUSCO protesting the deliberate bombing of its territory on 15 July from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 17 July, MONUSCO issued a press release clarifying that it did not fire any weapon on 15 July and encouraging the Government of Rwanda to work through the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism to ascertain the facts of the incident.

14. After a lull of several weeks, on 21 August M23 again attacked the Congolese armed forces and on 22 August it shelled Goma and MONUSCO positions in Munigi Heights, violating the security zone established by the Mission on 30 July in the Goma-Sake area. M23 indiscriminately shelled populated areas in and around Goma, including near camps for internally displaced persons and the airport. After M23 started shelling Goma, on 24 August protestors accusing MONUSCO of inaction attacked MONUSCO facilities near Goma airport with stones and Molotov cocktails.

15. As a result of M23 shelling areas around Goma populated by civilians and MONUSCO positions, from 22 to 28 August a total of 8 civilians were killed and at least 40 injured. In addition, 1 peacekeeper from the Tanzanian contingent was

killed and 14 peacekeepers from the South African and Tanzanian contingents were wounded at their position in the Munigi area; one of the Tanzanian peacekeepers subsequently died of his injuries. On 28 August, after targeting M23 positions with artillery fire and strikes by attack helicopters, the Congolese armed forces launched an assault on Kibati Heights, which was controlled by M23, forcing the armed group to withdraw from where it was attacking Goma, its airport and the camps for internally displaced persons. MONUSCO provided tactical support to the Congolese armed forces, using its own artillery, mortars and ground troops from the Intervention Brigade and the brigade in North Kivu, as well as attack helicopters. On 30 August, M23 retreated to Kibumba.

16. Between 22 and 29 August, in at least three instances, artillery shells hit populated areas in Rwandan territory near the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, killing 3 civilians and wounding 34 others. In response to a statement of the spokesperson for the Rwandan Defence Force accusing the Congolese armed forces of having used its artillery to deliberately shell Rwandan territory, Mr. Mende alleged, during a press conference on 23 August, that, in the context of renewed attacks by M23 elements on the Congolese armed forces, artillery shells hitting residential areas of Goma and outlying areas in Munigi on 22 August had been fired from Rwandan territory. On the same day, in Goma, MONUSCO engaged with the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism, which could not immediately confirm that mortar rounds were landing in or near the Rwandan border town of Gisenyi. From Munigi Heights, MONUSCO witnessed M23, from its position in Kibati, near the border, firing mortars, rockets and artillery on Rwandan territory on 22, 24, 28 and 29 August. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rwanda, Louise Mushikiwabo, issued a statement on 28 August accusing the Congolese armed forces of firing at least 34 rounds into Rwanda in the month of August, characterizing those events as a "provocation" and insisting that Rwanda would not hesitate to take action to defend itself. In an attempt to prevent a further escalation of the situation, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the MONUSCO Force Commander travelled on 29 August to Kigali to meet the Rwandan authorities. The concerted diplomatic efforts of my Special Envoy Mary Robinson, the Special Representative of the African Union Commission Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, the Special Representative of the United States of America Russ Feingold and the Senior Coordinator of the European Union Koen Vervaeke also helped to defuse tensions in the region.

17. On 8 July, I received a letter from the Government of Rwanda alleging collusion between the Congolese armed forces and the Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR), as well as collaboration between the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade and FDLR. On 16 July, I requested that the Government of Rwanda provide concrete evidence to substantiate its claims. On 17 July, I received a letter from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo refuting the allegations made by Rwanda. On 20 August, Rwanda provided additional information regarding the claims, which were not confirmed by MONUSCO but transmitted to the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism for further investigation.

18. During the reporting period, other armed groups, notably the Mouvement populaire d'autodéfense, the Mayi-Mayi Nyatura and the Forces de défense des intérêts du peuple congolais, attacked M23 in different locations in Nyiragongo and Rutshuru territories. On 6 July, over 30 armed Mayi-Mayi elements in civilian clothes attacked M23 elements in Kanyaruchinya and reportedly also fired at the

local population, killing one person. In response to the imminent threat posed to the civilian population, MONUSCO engaged the Mayi-Mayi elements, killing one, injuring two and arresting another.

19. During the reporting period, the Nduma défense du Congo (NDC), also known as Mayi-Mayi Cheka, attacked positions of the Congolese armed forces in North Kivu. On 7 July, NDC elements, led by Cheka himself, attacked the Congolese armed forces in Luvungi, Walikale territory, reportedly killing two soldiers and displacing over 500 civilians. Mayi-Mayi Cheka and a coalition of the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain, FDLR and Mayi-Mayi Nyatura clashed on a number of occasions, further displacing civilians in Walikale territory.

20. In the Grand Nord area, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and local Mayi-Mayi groups continued to pose a threat, attacking prisons and positions of the Congolese armed forces. On 1 July, a group of about 80 Mayi-Mayi elements attacked, reportedly with the support of ADF, the prison in the town of Beni, freeing 244 inmates, including 74 convicted soldiers, whom the Mayi-Mayi reportedly attempted to recruit. On 10 July, ADF attacked the Congolese armed forces at Kamango, 80 km east of Beni. The fighting reportedly led to the displacement of some 66,000 civilians from Kamango and surrounding areas. On 14 July, while travelling from Beni to Kamango in North Kivu, a MONUSCO patrol was ambushed by ADF elements; two United Nations vehicles were damaged. On 15 July, ADF fired near Kamango on United Nations helicopters, slightly damaging two. On 20 July, ADF killed 5 Congolese soldiers and injured 15 others in an attempt to regain control of Kamango. With MONUSCO support through the deployment of attack helicopters, the Congolese armed forces held Kamango. However, most of the surrounding areas remained unsafe for returnees.

21. The security situation in South Kivu deteriorated during the period under review. Amid a stalled integration process, armed groups, including Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba, Mayi-Mayi Bede, the Forces populaires pour la démocratie du Congo and the Union des forces révolutionnaires du Congo-Raia Mukombozi intensified lootings, forced recruitment, unlawful deprivation of liberty and the collection of illegal taxes.

22. On 13 August, following clashes between the Congolese armed forces and Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba on 8 and 9 August near Katanga village, 18 km south of Baraka, Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba elements attacked positions of the Congolese armed forces near the town of Baraka, in Fizi territory. Their objective was reportedly to free several of their captured fighters and regain a tactical advantage. According to the Congolese armed forces, 13 Mayi-Mayi elements were killed and 11 others were wounded. On 15 August, in Uvira territory, near Mutarule, an area plagued by inter-ethnic violence, eight civilians, including four children from the Bafuliru community, were killed in their homes at night by unknown assailants. A territorial commission of inquiry was established to investigate the incident.

23. During the reporting period, FDLR increased its presence in areas vacated by Mayi-Mayi Yakutumba in South Kivu. From mid-July onward, reports indicated that FDLR elements were moving towards Mwenga territory. There were also ongoing reports that elements of the Forces nationales pour la libération du Burundi were filtering in through various crossing points in Uvira territory.

24. In Maniema, various Mayi-Mayi groups, including Mayi-Mayi Raia Mutomboki, reinforced their presence around mineral-rich sites near Punia, Pangi, Kabambare, Kasese and Lubutu, leading to the displacement of at least 130,000 civilians. Populations along the Maniema-South Kivu border were the target of looting and other human rights abuses committed by the Congolese armed forces stationed in the village of Kilembwe, in South Kivu.

25. In Katanga, attacks on civilians by Mayi-Mayi groups and newly created self-defence militias continued. The number of internally displaced persons continued to rise: an estimated 44,000 persons were newly displaced in July in Pweto territory, in the wake of operations launched by the Congolese armed forces against Mayi-Mayi groups. In the Bendera area of northern Katanga, near the border with South Kivu, FDLR elements carried out attacks against civilians in villages and artisanal gold-mining sites, as well as against travellers on the Kalemie-Nyunzu road.

26. In Orientale Province, the security situation in areas affected by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remained relatively calm and LRA attacks continued to decrease. Although LRA elements remained active north of Ango, Bas-Uélé, no significant incidents were reported. However, some residual LRA elements reportedly carried out isolated attacks in the Ngilima-Bangadi-Niangara area and along the Dungu-Faradje road in Haut-Uélé.

27. In southern Irumu and Aru territories, the situation remained fragile. On 13 July, near Lake Albert, 11 fishermen were abducted by the Forces de résistance patriotiques en Ituri (FRPI). In Aru district, the Armée de libération du peuple congolais (ALPC) continued to be a threat to civilians accused by the militia of collaborating with the Congolese armed forces. Both the Congolese armed forces and the Congolese national police were targeted by elements of ALPC in Ingbokolo, where a soldier was killed on 11 July. In southern Irumu, on 22 July, FRPI elements killed a soldier during a clash. On 23 August, the Congolese armed forces launched operations, with limited MONUSCO support, against FRPI elements around Aveba, 70 km south of Bunia. The fighting caused the displacement of 5,000 civilians who gathered for protection around the MONUSCO operating base in Aveba. By 27 August, FRPI elements had regrouped and recaptured Sekele, 8 km north of Aveba. In the following weeks, Congolese armed forces and FRPI clashed repeatedly near Soke, which resulted in the displacement of over 17,000 persons, who were joined by others fleeing operations by the Congolese armed forces against ADF near Beni.

Humanitarian situation

28. The total estimated number of internally displaced persons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo stood at 2.6 million as at 31 August. North Kivu, with over 1 million internally displaced persons, and South Kivu, with over 700,000, remained the most affected provinces, accounting for some 65 per cent of the total. In Maniema, the number of internally displaced persons exceeded 200,000 on 31 July, mainly owing to fighting spilling over from South Kivu. In Katanga, the number of internally displaced persons continued to increase since June 2012 as a result of the activity of armed groups; around 370,000 internally displaced persons were registered in that province as at 31 August.

29. Humanitarian needs among internally displaced persons continued to increase, notably for food, health, shelter and protection. Provision of water and sanitation facilities continued to be a priority, in particular as several outbreaks of cholera were reported, especially in South Kivu. The nutritional status of children remained a concern, especially for displaced children under the age of 5. Also, several schools continued to be used for shelter by internally displaced persons in Goma.

30. The humanitarian impact of the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continued to be felt throughout the region, with new influxes of refugees heading to Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. As at 31 August, approximately 440,000 Congolese refugees were being hosted in countries of the Great Lakes region and Central Africa. The Democratic Republic of the Congo was also host to nearly 180,000 refugees from other countries in the region, including the Central African Republic.

31. During a visit by its Executive Director to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, from 17 to 20 July, the World Food Programme announced that it would provide an additional $458 million to assist victims of conflict and vulnerable groups during the period from July 2013 to December 2015. The mid-year review of the humanitarian action plan for 2013, estimated at $892 million and funded at nearly 51 per cent as at 9 September, shifted some funding towards new internally displaced persons and refugees from the Central African Republic. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization received $4 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund for urgent immunization efforts against measles.

Economic developments

32. On 6 July, in his mid-term assessment of the performance of his government, Prime Minister Matata Ponyo announced that the growth rate was expected to reach 8 per cent and inflation to remain below 1 per cent in 2013. While production in the mining sector remained robust and continued to drive economic growth, a decline in the international market prices of minerals had reduced the impact of rising outputs. On 8 July, President Kabila inaugurated in Moanda, Bas-Congo, the country's first fibre-optic network, connected through an underwater system of cables.

Regional developments

33. Regional developments revolved essentially around efforts to implement the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, against the backdrop of the deterioration of the security environment in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and limited progress in the Kampala talks between the Government and M23. I have reported further on these developments in my report on the implementation of the Framework, in particular on the summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region held on 5 September, which focused on the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

III. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Protection of civilians

34. In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, attacks against civilians continued to increase. The United Nations protection cluster recorded close to 5,000 incidents in North and South Kivu in July. In Katanga, threats from Mayi-Mayi groups remained significant, with the number of reported incidents reaching 120 as at 31 July. In Orientale Province, 455 incidents involving civilians were reported. These incidents included 13 attacks attributed to LRA, notably the abduction of 13 adults and 3 children. MONUSCO resorted increasingly to the use of its mobile reserve and quick reaction forces to enhance the protection of civilians in areas of concern. During the reporting period, eight joint protection teams were deployed to enhance protection measures for civilians in both Kivus and in Orientale Province. MONUSCO and national security forces received 401 protection alerts through community alert networks about possible threats to civilians. MONUSCO followed up on the alerts through the deployment of an investigative patrol or a quick reaction force. On 20 July, to counter imminent threats of violence to civilians on the Goma-Sake axis, MONUSCO established a security zone in and around Goma, announcing that all individuals who were not members of the national security forces would be disarmed.

Mission deployment and operations against armed groups

35. In line with mandated objectives, 92 per cent of MONUSCO forces continued to operate in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Extensive MONUSCO patrolling activity (including joint patrols with the Congolese armed forces and the Congolese national police) continued throughout North and South Kivu, as well as in Orientale Province, Maniema and Katanga. MONUSCO supported a number of military operations to protect civilians, including joint operations with the Congolese armed forces in Ituri district, Orientale Province and Uvira territory (South Kivu), as well as the Congolese armed forces-led operation to dislodge M23 from Kibati Heights in North Kivu. MONUSCO closed seven team sites to allow for the creation of additional force reserves, which would help the Mission to deploy its forces with greater flexibility.

36. Some 45 MONUSCO staff officers were redeployed to support the rehabilitation of the tactical training centre at Kisangani and the establishment of an information analysis and operational cell in Kinshasa to manage, in the future, unarmed unmanned aerial surveillance systems.

37. With regard to the Intervention Brigade, a total of 2,153 elements from Malawi, South Africa and the United Republic of Tanzania had deployed by 31 August, against an authorized strength of 2,956. Around 750 soldiers from Malawi, as well as enablers such as additional attack helicopters and unarmed and unmanned aerial surveillance systems, have yet to deploy. The Intervention Brigade did, however, begin operating within the newly established security zone around

Goma on 31 July and supported operations by the Congolese armed forces against M23 from 21 to 30 August with ground troops, attack helicopters and artillery fire.

Monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo

38. While the procurement and deployment of unarmed and unmanned aerial surveillance systems are under way, the Mission has undertaken a review of existing procedures and mechanisms for monitoring the arms embargo. As a result, MONUSCO is developing new procedures to standardize and streamline the recording of arms, weapons and ammunition flows in the context of military operations and disarmament and demobilization activities. A training package is being developed for all Mission personnel involved in monitoring the arms embargo.

39. Efforts were made to monitor movements along the eastern border areas in North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. During the reporting period, MONUSCO received credible reports of external support to M23. As MONUSCO is now part of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism, such reports should, in the future, be verified with the Mechanism.

40. The Mission shared all information available on weapons seizures with the Group of Experts on the arms embargo against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This included seizures by the Congolese armed forces of military hardware previously in the possession of M23.

Support to security sector reform and police reform

41. MONUSCO and other international partners continued to provide technical assistance and financial support for the ongoing training of new recruits of the Congolese armed forces, in compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces. In addition, MONUSCO and other partners are providing support for the training of 25 Congolese army officers in programme and project development and implementation.

42. In the area of police reform, MONUSCO strengthened its strategy of co-locating Mission staff with the Congolese national police in Goma, in an effort to enhance the mentoring and reporting capacity of the Police.

43. During the reporting period, MONUSCO, in collaboration with the International Organization for Migration and the Congolese national police, organized two workshops in Kisangani with the aim of sensitizing 300 female police personnel on methods to fight sexual and gender-based violence and sexual exploitation and abuse. Also in Kisangani, four police commissariats of the special police for the protection of women and children were established and handed over, along with five vehicles, 20 motorbikes and logistics and computer equipment. Twenty-five senior staff of the Congolese national police, including five women, received training in information technology. In Katanga Province, MONUSCO police trained 43 trainers of the Congolese national police and instructors of the Kasapa Police Training Centre. Also, in Orientale Province, MONUSCO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched the fifth long-term

training session on law enforcement and human security for 500 police staff in that province.

Human rights

44. The human rights situation continued to be marked by numerous reports of violations of human rights by the Government and violations of international humanitarian law by armed groups, as well as by elements of the national security forces.

45. From 2 to 10 July 2013, MONUSCO sent a joint investigation team composed of representatives of the judicial authorities and MONUSCO personnel on mission to Kamandi Gite, Lubero territory, North Kivu Province. The investigators were able to document 63 cases of rape, at least 4 cases of summary execution and other cases of ill-treatment or torture, forced labour, arbitrary arrest, illegal detention and destruction of property allegedly committed by soldiers and park rangers of the Congolese Wildlife Authority during the period from 22 December 2010 to 4 January 2011 in Ndwali locality. The human rights violations reportedly occurred in the context of forced evictions of the local population in an attempt by the authorities to recover lands reportedly belonging to the Virunga National Park.

46. On 15 July 2013, the military garrison tribunal in Haut-Katanga convicted four soldiers, one of whom had the rank of commander, for summarily executing, on 2 July 2013, 14 detainees who had been arrested on suspicion of being Mayi-Mayi fighters. Also during the reporting period, at least five Congolese national police officers, five elements of the Congolese armed forces and one administrative officer were convicted for practising or encouraging torture.

47. There were also reports of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the context of renewed violence in North Kivu Province in mid-July, when clashes erupted afresh between M23 and the Congolese armed forces in Mutaho. MONUSCO is also investigating over 40 cases of unlawful deprivation of liberty and abduction by M23 in Kiwanja and Kibumba, North Kivu Province, during the period from 22 to 24 July 2013. In addition, it was reported that on 22 July at least three civilians who had tried to escape from M23 after having been forcibly recruited were summarily executed in Kibumba.

Sexual violence

48. As at 15 September, MONUSCO recorded cases of sexual violence against at least 104 women and girls in conflict-affected provinces. Those cases were allegedly committed by armed groups and members of the national security forces. Armed groups, in particular Mayi-Mayi combatants operating mainly in North Kivu, were responsible for 59 cases. Soldiers were allegedly responsible for 39 cases, most of which had occurred in North and South Kivu provinces. Other State agents were responsible for the 6 remaining cases.

49. According to UNICEF, medical and psychosocial assistance was provided to 12,391 persons, including 6,522 children, during the reporting period within the framework of assistance to survivors of sexual violence.

Child protection and armed conflict

50. During the reporting period, MONUSCO, UNICEF and other child protection actors documented, through the monitoring and reporting mechanism, the cases of 31 children (5 girls and 26 boys) who had been recruited by armed groups; 11 of the children were under the age of 15. Most of the children had been used as porters, cooks and fighters. In addition, it was documented that 2,234 children (426 girls and 1,808 boys) had escaped or had been separated from armed forces and groups during that period. MONUSCO, UNICEF and other child protection actors also documented the cases of 47 children (20 girls and 27 boys) who were killed or maimed as a direct result of conflict-related violence during the reporting period.

51. As a result of increased advocacy efforts and collaboration with Government security forces, 30 children formerly associated with armed groups were released from detention facilities of the Congolese armed forces or other security services.

52. During the period under review, MONUSCO trained more than 49 Congolese national police officers, 1,182 members of the Congolese armed forces and 1,236 elements of the Intervention Brigade in child protection measures and children's rights.

Justice and correction institutions

53. MONUSCO and United Nations agencies continued to assist in the reform of the justice system, including by finalizing five projects for implementing the United Nations multi-year joint justice programme. These projects aim at strengthening the criminal justice system, supporting the creation of the three new high-level jurisdictions established by the 2006 Constitution and strengthening the High Council of Magistrates. On 25 July, in support of the Government's planning capacities, MONUSCO presented its mapping of the civil justice system to the Minister of Justice and Human Rights.

54. Support provided for the deployment of mobile courts resulted in 132 cases being heard and 50 judgements being rendered by civilians and military courts. Support was also provided for the conduct of 125 judicial inspections of detention cells, resulting in the regularization of 274 cases of irregular detention and 91 releases. MONUSCO continued to assist the military justice service in investigating and prosecuting serious crimes in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. With funding from the European Union, in July MONUSCO and UNDP launched a project to support the establishment of two new prosecution support cells in Katanga and Orientale provinces, which are in addition to the five cells that already exist.

55. MONUSCO intensified its support to strengthen prison capacities in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. A six-month training course for 100 military officers to be deployed to military prisons was completed in September. In addition, 14 newly recruited prison officers in Mbandaka Province and 48 prison directors in Orientale, Maniema, Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental provinces received basic training. Overall, security in prisons remained volatile, with external attacks being carried out in the prisons of Kasapa (Lubumbashi) and Beni by Mayi-Mayi armed elements.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration

56. During the reporting period, fighters and dependants from Congolese and foreign armed groups participated in the MONUSCO disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme. Among them were 200 Congolese members of armed groups, of which 63 were children associated with armed groups. Around 132 foreign armed group elements presented themselves to MONUSCO since 1 July, of whom 94 were fighters and 38 dependants. Of the 94 foreign fighters, 51 were from FDLR and 21 from M23. Of the remaining 22 foreign fighters, 21 stated that they were Rwandan nationals demobilized from either the Congolese armed forces or various Congolese armed groups and 1 was a Ugandan national demobilized from LRA.

57. MONUSCO and the United Nations country team continued to provide technical support to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the design of a single and overarching disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programme for both Congolese and foreign fighters. With the support of MONUSCO and the country team, the unit implementing the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme finalized the draft programme and submitted it for the Government's approval. The draft programme is budgeted at $85 million, which still needs to be mobilized.

58. As of mid-September, 2,234 children, including 426 girls, were released, provided with temporary care, reunified with their families and provided with reintegration support through the UNICEF-led child disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme.

Mine action

59. MONUSCO recorded an increase in requests for the removal of unexploded ordnance from schools and transit camps for disarmed fighters. In July and August, 4,059 unexploded ordnance and 30,615 small arms ammunitions were safely removed in the provinces of North and South Kivu, Orientale, Maniema and Katanga. Emergency explosive ordnance disposal activities were conducted in the Kibati area after M23 retreated. In August, an emergency hotline number was launched to streamline requests for the clearance of unexploded ordnance and the provision of explosive management support from all MONUSCO sections.

Stabilization and peace consolidation progress

60. Despite increased armed group activities and related tensions in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, partners of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy continued to implement programmes. Progress was made, in particular, on road rehabilitation and increased quality of administrative services.

61. Based on the completed strategic review of the Strategy, a draft integrated programme framework was completed in mid-September. The programme framework, which will be the subject of consultations to be held in the coming

period among Government authorities, international partners and donors, includes a monitoring and evaluation framework and a comprehensive implementation strategy.

62. MONUSCO organized sensitization campaigns to reinforce collaboration between local authorities and the population targeting more than 3,800 civil servants, local authorities and committees of the stabilization and reconstruction plan for eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in North Kivu, South Kivu and Orientale provinces.

63. MONUSCO also started working with the Government to implement the stabilization strategy in the wake of operations against armed groups by creating "islands of stability" to restore State authority and enable the establishment of conditions conducive to improved governance and long-term development.

Extraction of and trade in natural resources

64. On 24 July, the Government launched the regional certification mechanism for minerals of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. This certification scheme aims to guarantee that all exported minerals are "conflict-free", in other words that they come from mining sites where no armed groups or military forces are involved in mining or trading activities. Within this new framework, MONUSCO remained directly involved, together with the Ministry of Mines, in the validation of mining sites in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. These validation exercises took place in Kalimbi, Nkwiru and Manga, in Kalehe territory, South Kivu, in June 2013. An important validation exercise for mining sites covered by the Tin Supply Chain Initiative of the International Tin Research Institute took place in August in Katanga as part of the implementation of the regional certification mechanism.

65. Progress was made in the establishment of mineral trading centres in Masisi and Walikale territories. Under the auspices of the Minister of Mines and MONUSCO, a draft agreement has been finalized between the mine title holder and the cooperative of artisanal miners in Rubaya, in Masisi territory. Government authorities and partners have also been exploring ways to implement the traceability system in the Bisie mining area in Walikale territory, covered by the Ndjingila trading centre.

IV. Safety and security of United Nations personnel within the context of operations of the Intervention Brigade

66. With the deployment of the Intervention Brigade under way, MONUSCO undertook a security risk assessment and review of its existing security measures and procedures to identify risks faced by United Nations civilian and military personnel in the execution of their duties and responsibilities. The assessment concluded that a possible increase in direct and indirect attacks, ambushes, kidnappings and hijackings, as well as the presence of unexploded ordnance and mines, constituted the main security risks. M23 and other armed groups were the main sources of these risks, but the local population, particularly in the Kivus, was also increasingly responsible. In response, MONUSCO adopted new security

measures and procedures for regional offices, including measures to address situations of armed fighters seeking refuge or surrendering at United Nations facilities.

67. While the threats and the security risks confronting United Nations staff, premises and operations remained low in the western part of the country, the situation in the east was markedly different: a total of 26 security incidents were recorded during the period from 1 July to 9 September. Violent anti-MONUSCO protests, during which the Mission was accused of inaction in the face of the threat posed by M23, were held in Nyiragongo territory, on 16 July, and in Goma, on 18 July and on 2 and 24 August. During the protests, three MONUSCO staff members were injured and nine United Nations vehicles were damaged.

68. The renewed violence and indiscriminate firing by M23 in North Kivu in mid-August further increased the risks faced by United Nations personnel. On 24 August, three armoured personnel carriers and one MONUSCO ambulance were hit by bullets and shrapnel when M23 fired at MONUSCO positions. As reported in paragraph 16 above, M23 firing at MONUSCO positions from 22 to 28 August resulted in several casualties among MONUSCO peacekeepers. On 28 August, owing to M23 firing at the airport of Goma, MONUSCO cancelled its civilian flights to that city, relocated aircraft away from the airport and activated contingency plans.

V. Mission reconfiguration and road map for the transfer of responsibilities

Joint assessments

69. In July, joint assessments were conducted by MONUSCO and Government representatives to assess the security and humanitarian situation and progress in the extension of State authority in 30 territories and localities throughout Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu and Katanga provinces. The teams that carried out the joint assessments took note of changes in the security and humanitarian situation throughout the provinces assessed (see section II of the present report, on major developments). The teams found that during the reporting period MONUSCO responded to the requirements for the overall implementation of its mandate, in particular to the priority task of protecting civilians.

Transfer of tasks

70. In accordance with paragraph 17 of resolution 2098 (2013), MONUSCO initiated the process of identifying tasks to be transferred to the United Nations country team (or, alternatively, to the Government). These are tasks in which the country team has a comparative advantage or that involve action in areas not affected by armed conflict.

71. While MONUSCO and the United Nations country team work very closely in a number of areas, the resources and capacities available to partners of the country team do not match those available to peacekeeping operations. Consequently, a transfer of tasks cannot be viewed as a one-to-one handover. Consensus was reached

on the transfer of certain activities from MONUSCO to the country team in the following areas: demining, technical election support, civil affairs, gender, child protection, justice and corrections, and sexual violence. This will allow the Mission to focus on its core mandated tasks (see paras. 12, 14 and 15 of Security Council resolution 2098 (2013)).

72. The preliminary road map for the transfer of tasks set out below and next steps are informing the Mission's results-based planning for the 2014-2015 budget, which includes an assessment of possible reductions in expenditure. An in-depth analysis of its priorities, planning assumptions and likely future resource requirements is under way, with the aim of increasing capacities for field offices in the Kivus, Ituri and northern Katanga. This planning process is also being shaped by the continued shift of resources to conflict-affected areas and by the need to support the implementation of national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and the outcome of the national consultations.

Preliminary road map

73. On the basis of agency mandates and priorities agreed with the Government and contained in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for the period from 2013 to 2017, a preliminary set of activities was jointly identified for transfer over the course of varying periods of time and subject to the availability of resources. This initial road map takes into consideration that the transfer of tasks to the country team will be undertaken gradually, with some tasks handed over in the short term (6-12 months), where capacities already exist and/or where the Mission can make adjustments within a budget cycle and country team partners have existing capacity. Other tasks will be transferred in the medium to long term (1-2 years), to allow country team members to mobilize additional resources and increase capacities if and where required, particularly since some costs may increase significantly if country team members can no longer depend on logistical support from MONUSCO. The initial road map will be finalized once a capacity and resource assessment has been completed.

In the short term

74. Given the dual reporting lines and the composition of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office in MONUSCO, several technical cooperation activities are already being implemented by OHCHR. Specific activities relating to sexual violence, database profiling management and protection have already been transferred to OHCHR, although adequate funding through extrabudgetary contributions needs to be ensured.

75. All capacity-building tasks targeting provincial and local authorities and civil society, including in relation to local governance and gender issues, will be transferred to the United Nations country team. This will allow MONUSCO to focus its activities on reconciliation, confidence-building and conflict management and resolution, as well as on strengthening its effort to mainstream gender in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

76. UNICEF and MONUSCO will continue to co-lead the monitoring and reporting of grave violations against children in armed conflict, on engaging in

dialogue with perpetrators of such violations and developing action plans, and on advocating for the protection of children in armed conflict. UNICEF will lead in the implementation of prevention and response mechanisms. MONUSCO has reassigned Child Protection Advisers to areas affected by armed conflict and will continue to provide support to the Government for the implementation of the United Nations-Government action plan to prevent and stop child recruitment and other grave child rights violations by armed forces, jointly with UNICEF. In areas not affected by conflict, coordination activities in support of the action plan will be transferred to UNICEF.

77. In the area of corrections, MONUSCO will discontinue its work on juveniles in detention. UNICEF is already providing assistance in this area and could absorb additional responsibilities, subject to the availability of funding and capacity. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Office for Project Services and the International Organization for Migration would be able to assist with infrastructure and support to corrections facilities.

78. As requested by the Security Council in paragraph 18 of its resolution 2098 (2013), a number of tasks shall be transferred as soon as feasible to the United Nations country team. Those tasks, which include demining support, risk education in areas not affected by conflict, assistance to victims of mines and support to the Government on compliance with treaty obligations and on the implementation of the national strategic plan on mine action, will, over the short term, be transferred to the Mine Action Service, which is the United Nations body mandated to carry out such activities within the country team. It must be recognized, however, that this will require substantial extrabudgetary resources. The Mine Action Service is part of both MONUSCO and the country team, and its activities are divided into "Mission support" activities (funded by the assessed budget) and "humanitarian mine action" activities (funded through extrabudgetary means). In anticipation of operations by the Intervention Brigade, MONUSCO will continue, in the short term, to deploy its internal explosive ordnance disposal and ammunition management capacities through the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre, under the management of the Mine Action Service, in order to deliver, in accordance with international standards, rapid explosive ordnance disposal responses and ammunition management operations in support of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts and other Mission activities.

79. In line with the request of the Security Council, MONUSCO commenced planning for the phasing out of its electoral technical assistance, training and capacity-building to the Independent National Electoral Commission, while continuing to support my Special Representative's good offices to encourage the organization of credible and transparent provincial and local elections. The recommendations arising from the electoral needs assessment mission mentioned in paragraph 12 above will inform the way forward on MONUSCO assistance to the electoral process.

In the medium to long term

80. In the medium to long term, a number of tasks currently linked to MONUSCO under the Joint Justice Programme will be transferred to United Nations partners to allow the Mission to shift its regional focus to the east. Tasks related to the training of justice officials and the provision of technical advice and other assistance to the

civil and military justice systems, including for the organization of mobile court hearings, archiving and case management, will be transferred to UNDP, OHCHR and UNODC in non-conflict areas. However, key tasks, including capacity-building functions related to stabilization efforts in conflict-affected areas and related strategic support in Kinshasa cannot be transferred at this stage.

Next steps

81. Following the transfer of coordination responsibilities from MONUSCO to the United Nations country team through the appointment of joint area coordinators in Bas-Congo, Kasai Occidental and Kasai Oriental provinces, the Mission and its United Nations partners are reviewing current practices to optimize these arrangements.

82. As outlined in my report of 27 February 2013 (S/2013/119), MONUSCO is expanding the United Nations model office concept to further reallocate resources from areas not affected by armed conflict to priority areas in eastern provinces. The United Nations model office will retain a minimum presence to perform key mandated tasks in support of peace consolidation to continue monitoring the situation in areas currently considered as not affected by conflict for any potential risks to stability and the security of the local population.

83. In the meantime, MONUSCO and the United Nations country team will engage with the Government on the potential transfer of tasks to national partners, finalize a comparative advantage and capacity assessment of country team members in order to identify existing capacities and gaps, recommend measures to strengthen these capacities and develop a joint resource mobilization strategy for country team members.

84. In my next report to the Security Council, to be submitted in December 2013, I will present a more detailed road map, including a timetable for the transfer process. I will also include an analysis of risks and possible mitigation strategies.

VI. Observations

85. President Kabila and his Government have taken further steps to fulfil their national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. This has brought some hope that peace and security can be restored in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. I am encouraged by advances made in the launching of a national dialogue aimed at building consensus among a wide range of Congolese actors on how best to take forward critical reforms and policies. I regret, however, the absence of some parties from the political opposition. Advancing reforms is a complex process and requires political will. I encourage all Congolese stakeholders to continue a dialogue in which voices from across the political spectrum are heard. This is necessary to pave the way for a sustainable resolution of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, prepare the ground for the holding of credible and transparent national and local elections within the constitutional time frame and ensure a resolute focus on sustainable development.

86. These advances have been overshadowed by the renewed violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo as a result of increased activity by armed groups, particularly the attempted offensive by M23 against the Congolese armed forces and the population of Goma, as well as a surge in attacks by ADF in North Kivu. Serious security threats also persist in South Kivu, Katanga and parts of Orientale and Maniema provinces. Grave violations of international humanitarian law continue to be committed in the conflict-affected areas of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including abduction, rape, targeted killing and recruitment of children into armed groups.

87. I strongly condemn the threat posed to the security of the civilian population by the presence of M23 north of Goma, near Kibumba. The military activities of M23 continue to undermine State authority, lead to serious violations of humanitarian law, including the recruitment of children and cause mass displacements, and humanitarian suffering in North Kivu and surrounding areas. I deplore in the strongest terms the killing of 2 MONUSCO peacekeepers and the wounding of 13 others in North Kivu, when they came under fire from M23 while carrying out their mandated duties. The rebellion of M23, along with the presence of other foreign armed groups, is an obstacle to the normalization of relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and all its neighbours. I support the call of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region for a swift conclusion of the Kampala talks. An agreement reached through these talks should contribute to a durable settlement of the conflict. In the meantime, MONUSCO remains committed to taking all necessary actions in accordance with Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) to protect civilians in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.

88. My Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa will continue to work hand in hand and in consultation with other special envoys for the region, as well as the African Union, the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, with a view to redoubling efforts in support of the peace process. The international community has made significant investments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region. Its continued support is indispensible to move forward on critical reforms.

89. Recent events in Goma have demonstrated that the military component of MONUSCO, including the Intervention Brigade, is effective in supporting a broader political strategy. The support provided by the MONUSCO force to the Congolese armed forces played a crucial role in the protection of civilians in Goma and in camps for internally displaced persons from the imminent physical threat posed by M23 and in prompting the resumption of the Kampala talks. This robust posture is key to the success of our strategy, but it will also be used with caution, given the political and humanitarian implications of the use of force. Although MONUSCO will continue to do everything possible to protect civilians under imminent threat, its military component will not be able to resolve all the problems plaguing eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. The deployment and use of the Intervention Brigade is only one of many elements needed to address the recurring violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. In that regard, I encourage all the signatories to the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to implement their commitments in good faith.

90. MONUSCO is committed to stepping up its efforts to help the Congolese authorities to conduct essential reforms, in particular in the security sector, restore State authority, better protect civilians and disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former Congolese and foreign combatants. I am encouraged by the progress made in recent months by the Government in developing a draft national programme for the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of Congolese and foreign combatants. Steps must now be taken to accelerate its approval and plan for rapid mobilization of resources to support the new programme's implementation, as well as for interim activities. The implementation of other, crucial reforms must be expedited.

91. As requested in Security Council resolution 2098 (2013), the present report outlines a preliminary road map for the transfer of responsibilities to the United Nations country team and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in areas not affected by conflict, primarily in the western part of the country. It outlines a number of tasks that could be transferred to the country team. On the basis of an assessment of comparative advantages and resource gaps, as well as consultations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I will provide further details on the timeline and identify additional tasks to be transferred in my next report, in December 2013.

92. I would like to thank my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Martin Kobler, who assumed his functions on 13 August, and all the personnel of MONUSCO and the United Nations country team for their tireless efforts under very challenging circumstances. In particular, I wish to highlight the bravery and the determination of MONUSCO military and civilian personnel operating in what continues to be a very dangerous and unpredictable environment, especially in the conflict-affected areas. I pay particular homage to the Tanzanian contingent, which lost two of its soldiers protecting civilians in Goma on 28 August. My appreciation also goes to the countries contributing troops and police to MONUSCO, to donor countries and to the regional and multilateral organizations and non-governmental organizations that have continued to provide invaluable support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), by which the Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

2. In the resolution, the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of the situation in Mali and the implementation of the mandate of MINUSMA. In particular, the Council asked me to report every three months, from 1 July 2013, with updates on the security situation, the priority political elements of the transitional road map and the electoral process, as well as relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law. In addition, I was asked to include in my reports a review of troop levels, force generation and deployment of all constituent elements of MINUSMA. The present report covers the period from 10 June to 29 September 2013 and updates the information provided in my previous report.

II. Political process

3. During the reporting period, important steps were taken towards the implementation of the transitional road map and its two main objectives: the re-establishment of territorial integrity and the organization of transparent and credible elections. While many of the tasks envisaged under the road map have yet to be implemented, the mandate of the transitional Government came to an end on 4 September, when, following a peaceful presidential election conducted nationwide on 28 July and 11 August, Boubacar Keita was sworn in as the new President of Mali. On 5 September, Oumar Tatam Ly was appointed Prime Minister. The composition of a new 34-member Government was announced on 8 September. It includes a newly established Ministry for Reconciliation and Development of the Northern Regions. On 18 September, the Malian authorities announced that parliamentary elections would be held on 24 November.

4. On 18 June, in Ouagadougou, the transitional Government and the armed groups in the northern regions of Mali signed a preliminary agreement to hold the presidential election and inclusive peace talks in Mali. This followed weeks of intensive diplomatic efforts, including by my Special Representative, in support of the mediation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led

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by the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré. The armed group signatories included the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) and the Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA). The Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA) and the Coordination des mouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance, which witnessed the negotiations, officially adhered to the agreement on the same day. My Special Representative signed the agreement as a witness on behalf of the United Nations.

5. The preliminary agreement paved the way for the holding of a presidential election nationwide, including in the Kidal region, to be followed by inclusive discussions, commencing 60 days after the establishment of the new Government, on a comprehensive peace settlement. It provided, inter alia, modalities for the cessation of hostilities, the cantonment of armed groups and the gradual return of the Malian Defence and Security Forces to the Kidal region. It also provided for the establishment of an international commission of inquiry to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, sex crimes, drug trafficking and other serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law throughout Mali.

6. The preliminary agreement provided for follow-up mechanisms, in particular the Mixed Technical Commission on Security, responsible for monitoring the cessation of hostilities and the ceasefire, and the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, responsible for monitoring and supporting the implementation of the preliminary agreement, including resource mobilization. Those mechanisms are chaired by MINUSMA and involve the signatories and adherents to the agreement, as well as regional and international partners.

7. With facilitation by the Mixed Technical Commission on Security, the implementation of the preliminary agreement began immediately upon its signature, with a focus on the modalities for the first phase of the cantonment of armed group elements and the return of the Malian armed forces and State administration to Kidal. As agreed by the Mixed Technical Commission on Security on 2 July and following the deployment of MINUSMA in Kidal, 200 Malian armed forces personnel entered the town on 5 July, together with the Governor and other State and election administration officials. Three cantonment sites, two in Kidal town and one on the periphery, were designated for MNLA and HCUA. Approximately 800 combatants were regrouped at those sites, where they remain. Following their deployment in Kidal town, the Malian armed forces also deployed in Aguelhok and Tessalit, on 26 July.

8. The implementation of the preliminary agreement was also supported at the political level by the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, which is chaired by my Special Representative. At its first meeting, on 22 July, the Committee established a working group on logistical and financial support for the cantonment of armed groups and decided to review lessons learned from the implementation of previous peace agreements in Mali. In a joint declaration following the meeting, the parties called for the conduct of a peaceful presidential election and the implementation of confidence-building measures. Following intensive diplomatic efforts by my Special Representative and with the support of the international community, the Government released, on 7 August, two MNLA prisoners in accordance with the preliminary agreement. Eight additional prisoners were released on 16 August, and a further three on 21 August. On 26 September, however, MNLA, HCUA and MAA announced that they were suspending their participation in the implementation mechanisms

established under the preliminary agreement, claiming that the Government had not complied with its obligations.

9. On 6 August, the Government of Mauritania facilitated a meeting between MNLA, HCUA and MAA leaders in Nouakchott. Following the meeting, the three groups issued a joint statement calling for the cessation of inter-group attacks and for collaboration among them to ensure the security of the northern regions.

10. As part of the effort to increase public understanding and support for the preliminary agreement, from 1 to 3 July, MINUSMA held several consultative meetings with more than 150 women in Kidal town to discuss the role and contribution of women in implementing the agreement. The participants expressed diverse views, with some calling for a boycott of the elections and the independence of "Azawad", while others called for voters to participate in the election as a prelude to dialogue with elected Malian authorities.

11. In a separate development, the leader of the coup d'état in March 2012, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General by the transitional Government on 14 August. Colonel Moussa Sinko Coulibaly, Minister of Territorial Administration during the transition, and Colonel Didier Dacko, who commanded military operations in the north, were both promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. The decree appointing Lieutenant General Sanogo as Head of the military committee to monitor the reform of defence and security forces was abrogated on 28 August.

A. Dialogue and reconciliation

12. Dialogue and reconciliation activities remained limited during the reporting period. Following the first meeting of the new Government, on 9 September, President Keita announced the launch of the Assises du nord, which would discuss sustainable peace in northern Mali. On 15 September, the Minister of Reconciliation and Development of the Northern Regions, the Minister of Security and the Minister of Territorial Administration visited Kidal, where they met with local leaders to discuss issues related to peace and reconciliation.

13. MINUSMA continued to interact with the National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation with a view to determining how best to support its activities and to link those activities with the work of the bodies established under the preliminary agreement. It was agreed that MINUSMA would provide technical support to help the Commission design the dialogue process. Meanwhile, the Commission continued to explain its mandate through outreach activities with community leaders in Bamako district and northern Mali, including in Kidal.

B. Elections

14. The successful conduct of the two rounds of the presidential election on 28 July and 11 August was a significant step towards the full restoration of constitutional order in Mali. Despite the constraints imposed by a compressed electoral timetable, a volatile security situation and the simultaneous redeployment of the administration in the northern regions, the polls were a remarkable achievement. Some 48 per cent (3,345,253) of the registered voters participated in the process, the highest turnout

since 2002, in generally calm conditions with no significant security incidents reported. Through MINUSMA and the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations provided technical, financial, political and security support before, during and after the polling.

15. Extensive efforts for the registration of voters and the distribution of voter cards took place in challenging circumstances. The biometric electoral roll taken from the census (*recensement administratif à vocation d'état civil*) closed on 31 March. A total of 6,829,696 voters were identified, almost equally divided between men and women. From 5 to 27 June (and until 11 July in Kidal), the provisional electoral lists were verified nationwide and outside of Mali. The distribution of national identification cards, which also served as voter cards, started on 28 June nationwide and on 12 July in Kidal. Around 85 per cent of the cards had been distributed prior to the polls. The Government undertook considerable efforts to ensure the participation of all potential voters. Despite efforts to facilitate and organize the participation of refugees, however, very few voter cards were distributed in the refugee camps in Burkina Faso, the Niger and Mauritania, resulting in a very low rate of participation among those populations.

16. On 4 July, the Constitutional Court validated 28 candidates (including 1 woman) for the presidential election. One candidate subsequently withdrew, alleging irregularities in the preparation of the polls. The campaign was conducted peacefully from 7 to 26 July, and most candidates abided by the electoral code of conduct. While candidates were able to travel freely nationwide, only three visited Kidal.

17. Most polling stations opened and closed on 28 July at the times stipulated by the electoral law. Access was generally unhindered and voters were able to cast ballots, although incidents of voter intimidation were reported in the Kidal region and Ménaka. Many voters encountered problems in identifying their polling stations in the first round, but the process went much more smoothly during the second. Overall, national and international observers deemed the process free, transparent and credible. Eleven complaints were filed with the Constitutional Court following the first round, all of which were dismissed.

18. On 7 August, the Constitutional Court announced the final results of the first round of the presidential election. Mr. Keita obtained 39.8 per cent and Soumaila Cissé 19.7 per cent of the vote; since neither candidate had won over 50 per cent, a second round was conducted on 11 August. On 12 August, my Special Representative engaged both candidates as part of efforts to prevent any tensions that could lead to a post-electoral crisis. On that date, Mr. Cissé graciously conceded the election and visited Mr. Keita to extend his congratulations. On 20 August, the Constitutional Court announced the final results of the second round, confirming that Mr. Keita had been elected with 77.6 per cent of the vote.

19. Throughout the electoral period, my Special Representative met various stakeholders, including candidates, political parties, civil society leaders and youth groups, in Bamako to help create the best possible conditions for holding the election and preventing election-related violence. Other actors also played a significant role in promoting peaceful elections, including the women's group Plate forme de veille des femmes pour des élections sans violence et équitables au Mali, established with United Nations support to help ensure the electoral mobilization of women and youth and the prevention of post-electoral violence.

20. MINUSMA also played an active role in electoral security during the election period. From 27 July, joint MINUSMA and Malian police patrols were carried out in Bamako, Timbuktu, Gao, Mopti and Kidal. While the Malian police retained the lead role, this support was highly appreciated and was also provided during the second round of elections, on 11 August.

III. Security and stabilization

21. During the period under review, the overall security situation remained relatively stable but fragile, as illustrated by isolated clashes between armed groups in the northern regions, continuing tensions in the Kidal region, incidents of inter-communal violence in some areas and the persistent threat of asymmetric attacks by armed groups.

22. In the weeks prior to the signing of the preliminary agreement on 18 June, the Malian armed forces launched an offensive against MNLA positions in Anefis (approximately 115 km south of Kidal town) during which the Malian armed forces took control and consolidated its positions in the area, while MNLA strengthened its position in and around Kidal town. The parties maintained their positions until the agreement was signed, which paved the way for the deployment of a company of the armed forces to Kidal town and the assumption of responsibility by the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) (and subsequently MINUSMA) for the checkpoints controlling access to Kidal town.

23. The ceasefire between MNLA and HCUA and the Malian Government was generally respected during the reporting period, although tensions flared towards the end of September. Both parties violated the ceasefire through the uncoordinated movement of troops in the Kidal region. One incident of indirect fire between MNLA and the Malian armed forces occurred in Aguelhok on 15 August, which was quickly contained following an intervention by MINUSMA. On 11 September, violent clashes were reported between the armed forces and MNLA in Foita, 15 km south-west of Léré, close to the Mauritanian border, during which three armed forces personnel were injured. Nine MNLA personnel were arrested. On 27 September, a grenade was thrown at a bank being guarded by Malian forces in Kidal. On 29 and 30 September, the two forces exchanged fire in the centre of Kidal town.

24. The role of MINUSMA in providing security in Kidal includes maintaining checkpoints, conducting patrols and contributing to the de-escalation of tension. Upon the rehatting of the AFISMA troops as MINUSMA forces on 1 July, MINUSMA took control of checkpoints around Kidal town in accordance with the preliminary agreement. On 6 July, one of the MINUSMA checkpoints in Kidal town was attacked by unidentified armed elements during which a Beninese peacekeeper was wounded. On 8 July, MINUSMA deployed a tactical command post comprising two quick-reaction force companies in Kidal. A MINUSMA formed police unit was also deployed. MINUSMA later positioned an additional company in Aguelhok ahead of the deployment of the Malian armed forces to the town.

25. Although tensions have persisted in Kidal town, the election took place in a generally peaceful atmosphere. After the Malian armed forces began conducting patrols on its own in Kidal on 13 July, tensions flared with the community and the armed groups. On 18 July, MNLA and Malian Government supporters clashed in Kidal town. In the ensuing violence, one pro-Government demonstrator was killed

and the market was looted. Operation Serval, led by France, and MINUSMA deployed forces to control the situation. From 18 to 20 July, six election officials were abducted by an alleged representative of MNLA in Tessalit, but they were released on 21 July.

26. In Gao, the presence of armed MNLA elements disrupted the conduct of the polling in Telatai (250 km north of Ansongo) and in Alata commune, near Tidermene (150 km north of Ménaka). As a result, only two people voted in each locality.

27. Activities by extremist armed groups diminished following the military operations conducted by Operation Serval and the Malian armed forces in early 2013, and no major incidents were reported during the electoral period despite public threats by the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest to carry out disruptive action. There were, however, increased reports of activities by armed groups in the Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal regions as well as in neighbouring countries during the reporting period, including an asymmetric attack on a Malian military camp in Timbuktu on 29 September and the discovery of explosives. Those activities could be linked to attempts by those groups, some of which are reorganizing internally, to engage in trafficking or to evade Malian and international military forces. On 22 August, the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest announced that it had merged with a breakaway cell of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, to form a new group, Al-Mourabitoune. Some military reports also indicate that some armed groups, including Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, have been recruiting among local populations north of Timbuktu. On 20 August, a MINUSMA detachment was attacked by unidentified assailants at the Tassiga bridge, south of Ansongo. Since then, armed elements have been sighted frequently across the northern regions. On 7 September, a Serval patrol discovered a training base near Anefis that appeared to have been abandoned hastily by its occupants. Ammunition, medical equipment and other military items were collected. On 14 September, a Serval patrol came under fire from unidentified armed elements south of Anefis. On 29 September, a vehicle-borne explosive device was detonated at the entrance of a Malian military camp in Timbuktu in an attack that Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb subsequently claimed to have carried out. In addition to the occupants of the vehicle, the explosion killed two civilians and injured several other civilians and soldiers.

28. The security situation in some areas in the north was marked by sporadic clashes between armed groups or incidents of inter-communal violence. On 15 and 19 July, clashes between MAA and MNLA took place in Lerneb, west of Timbuktu town, and near Lake Faguibine, north of Timbuktu town. This coincided with threats of MAA attacks on In-Khalil, close to the Algerian border in the Kidal region, from their position in In-Afarak. On 13 August, fighting erupted between Arab and Tuareg groups in Bordj El Mokhtar in southern Algeria, near the border with Mali. Those clashes were reported to have resulted in a dozen deaths. On 14 August, clashes took place in In-Khalil, reportedly in connection with the incidents in Bordj El Mokhtar.

29. The frequency of violent inter-ethnic clashes has increased between and against members of the Arab, Tuareg and Peuhl communities, notably in Timbuktu and north of Kidal. On 12 August, in Léré, south-west of Timbuktu, a man was killed by a mob for his alleged links with extremist armed groups.

30. The threat of improvised explosive devices remained high, with eight incidents reported since 1 July, including the attack in Timbuktu on 29 September and another on 22 July in which two French soldiers were wounded by a remote-controlled device south of Bourem. Since March 2012, there have been 53 confirmed casualties (31 killed and 22 injured) from such attacks. Explosives or materials required to manufacture them continued to be discovered, including the discovery in early September of a vehicle containing approximately 1 ton of explosives and detonators south-west of Anefis.

31. With the support of the Mine Action Service, 650 items of unexploded ordnance had been cleared in northern Mali since 1 April. Much work remains to be done, however, to ensure that conflict-affected areas are free from threats of explosive ordnance. Through the efforts of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations has confirmed that 80 people have been victims of explosive remnants of war, including 11 killed and 69 injured, with half of the victims being children. The Mine Action Service has continued to support MINUSMA in providing awareness training to the Malian armed forces, humanitarian actors and United Nations personnel on threats from explosive remnants of war, landmines and improvised explosive devices. Nine teams from international mine action operators have been deployed in conflict-affected areas to assist in conducting surveys and disposing of explosive ordnance.

IV. Re-establishment of State authority

32. The transitional Government has worked to facilitate the return of local administrators, such as prefects and sub-prefects, to Gao, Timbuktu, Mopti and, more recently, Kidal. However, while some mayors continued to carry out limited functions during the occupation of the north by armed groups, State authority in the north has been severely affected by the crisis, and the return and functioning of State authorities is still at an early stage. A significant number of State officials have yet to return to their positions or cannot function owing to lack of security, the destruction of infrastructure and inadequate equipment.

A. Security sector reform

33. The European Union Training Mission in Mali, which comprises some 540 personnel, continued to support defence sector reform through the training of a second battalion at a training camp in Koulikoro. With the establishment of the new Government, MINUSMA expects an increased focus by national authorities and their partners on the reorganization of the Malian armed forces as envisaged under the preliminary agreement.

B. Law enforcement, justice and corrections institutions

34. The redeployment of judicial authorities to the northern regions has made very limited progress. Access to the formal justice system is challenging for most Malians given the lack of judicial institutions and the distances involved in reaching them. On 17 July, the transitional Government announced that temporary measures would be implemented to ensure the return of financial and justice institutions,

while the refurbishment and reconstruction of damaged buildings is ongoing. A number of joint Government, MINUSMA and international community missions were sent to Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu to assess conditions for the return of the judicial administration to those areas, including an evaluation of needs for the reopening of prisons. On 30 August, a prosecutor was deployed to Gao and has resumed his duties at the regional court. The return of the prison administration to the north is equally problematic. Project proposals are being developed in collaboration with several non-governmental organizations to facilitate the restoration of the prison system.

35. The presence of the Malian police, gendarmerie and national guard in the north remains very limited, but efforts to increase their numbers continue. As at 16 September, 175 police officers, 300 gendarmes and 230 national guards had been deployed to northern towns.

V. Human rights protection

A. Human rights

36. Since the signature of the preliminary agreement on 18 June, the number of allegations of grave violations of human rights has decreased markedly. The human rights situation remains fragile, however, with reports of violations and abuses allegedly committed by the Malian Defence and Security Forces and armed groups, including the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad, the Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest, as well as pro-Government militias such as Ganda Izo and Ganda Koy. On 26 June, in Gossi, Gao region, two civilians of Tuareg origin were allegedly executed by elements of Ganda Izo after being released by the Malian armed forces.

37. No major human rights violations were reported in relation to the election. The United Nations monitored the human rights situation in the context of electoral activities, particularly public gatherings and demonstrations. In this context, mobile teams were deployed in Bamako and surrounding districts as well as in the Sikasso, Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal regions.

38. The detention conditions of individuals held in relation to the conflict in the northern regions remains of concern and is subject to monitoring by United Nations human rights teams. In Bamako, despite the release of some detainees for lack of evidence, as at 17 September more than 200 individuals reportedly remained in detention pending trial, in poor conditions and with inadequate medical care. Eight detainees are also being held in Gao. Following the clashes between the Malian armed forces and MNLA in Foita on 11 September, 11 individuals were arrested in the Timbuktu region and transferred to Bamako, in addition to 9 others transferred on 14 September to Bamako. In addition, 30 individuals, including 5 children allegedly associated with armed groups, are being illegally held in the MNLA-run detention facility in Kidal (see also para. 47).

39. In terms of capacity-building, the United Nations provided training on human rights and elections to more than 1,500 police, gendarmerie, national guard and civil protection personnel in Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Segou, and Mopti.

Furthermore, the United Nations, in collaboration with the European Union Training Mission, trained 1,300 elements of the Malian armed forces on human rights, the protection of women and children and international humanitarian law prior to their deployment to the northern regions.

40. Throughout the reporting period, MINUSMA has continued to implement the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces in relation to support for AFISMA contingents prior to their rehatting as MINUSMA forces, as well as to the Malian armed forces. MINUSMA also continued to disseminate the policy to relevant national and regional partners, including the Malian armed forces, to help ensure the effective implementation of the policy in Mali.

B. Protection of civilians

41. Although the capabilities of extremist armed groups appear to have been reduced, asymmetric attacks against the civilian population remain a continuing possibility. The United Nations continued to assess risks to the civilian population to inform the development of a strategy for the protection of civilians. This drew on field visits to the northern regions, including to Gao and Timbuktu. The United Nations also continued to monitor the risk of intimidation of the population by armed groups throughout the northern regions. Furthermore, the relationship among and between communities in some parts of the northern regions remains tense, particularly among and between the Arab, Tuareg, Peuhl and Songhai communities. MINUSMA continued to engage community leaders with a view to reducing tension in that regard.

42. Returning refugees and internally displaced persons, faced with the daunting task of rebuilding their lives while at times facing accusations of collaboration with armed groups in the northern regions, appear to be particularly at risk of revenge attacks. On 21 July, local authorities prevented a demonstration by local militia elements known as the Jeunes patriotes against the return of persons of Arab descent to Dire. The continued existence of "self-defence" militias, some of which have a record of violence against civilians of specific ethnicities and a stated objective of acquiring weapons for self-defence purposes, may pose a risk to the population as a whole and to returnees in particular, especially those belonging to certain minority groups.

C. Conflict-related sexual violence

43. Allegations of sexual violence have declined significantly since 2012. However, incidents of sexual violence perpetrated by armed groups continued to be reported in the northern regions and particularly in Gao and around the town. The United Nations and its partners have established regional coordination committees on gender-based violence and provided kits for the treatment of 7,000 cases of rape and 3,750 dignity kits to displaced persons.

44. The United Nations has engaged with the parties listed in my 2012 report on conflict-related sexual violence (A/66/657-S/2012/33) as being responsible for carrying out such acts, including MNLA and HCUA, to inform them about their inclusion on the list and to discuss the actions required to prevent and respond to

conflict-related sexual violence. Training and sensitization activities were also conducted with the Malian armed forces and other protection actors, including AFISMA (and subsequently MINUSMA) personnel, in order to create the capacity to prevent and respond to cases of conflict-related sexual violence. Many victims and civil society organizations have nonetheless expressed frustration about the lack of prosecutions in cases of sexual violence crimes.

D. Child protection

45. Child protection remains a serious concern. Grave violations committed against children continue to be reported, particularly in the northern regions, where some children remain associated with armed groups including "self-defence" militias. According to partner organizations, children formerly associated with armed groups continued to return spontaneously to their homes and communities. In some cases, families had facilitated the recruitment into armed groups of their own children through religious and local community leaders in the hope that they would receive religious education and that, when needed, the families would be protected against attacks by armed group elements. Some families reported cases of missing children, while others indicated that they did not want their children to be identified for fear of reprisal. Armed groups allegedly perpetrated rape and other incidents of grave sexual violence against children. Cases of the recruitment and use of children, as well as of killing and maiming, have been recorded, including the killing of eight children in incidents involving explosive remnants of war. In addition, there are continuing concerns about the arbitrary detention of children on security charges by the gendarmerie and other components of the Malian armed forces.

46. The mainstreaming of child protection and the full implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism established under Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) has continued since the establishment of MINUSMA. The United Nations and international non-governmental organizations have established a country monitoring and reporting task force to lay the foundation for the establishment of the mechanism.

47. A protocol for the release, transfer and protection of children associated with armed forces and groups was signed on 1 July by the Government and my Special Representative. It provides a legal framework for the release and reintegration of those children. In this context, negotiations between MNLA and the United Nations led to the release of three out of eight children formerly associated with armed groups and detained in an MNLA jail in Kidal. The released children were sent to a UNICEF-supported transit centre for psychosocial care and reintegration. Advocacy is ongoing for the release of the remaining five children. Following advocacy and follow-up, five children were also released from the Central Prison of Bamako on 16 August.

VI. Early recovery and development

48. The delivery of basic social services such as water, health care, education and protection remains limited in the northern regions because of the slow return of civil service personnel and the continued need for the rehabilitation of infrastructure. Approximately 65 per cent of health centres in conflict-affected areas are either

non-functional or only partially functional and about half of the schools remain closed.

49. In 2013 the rate of growth of the Malian economy is expected to reach 4.8 per cent, supported by the dynamism of the agricultural and gold-mining sectors as well as the resumption of international aid. The Government has also generated additional domestic revenue with the sale of the third mobile telephone licence. Substantial expenditure has occurred under the revised finance law to accommodate extraordinary requirements, with additional provisions made for the presidential and legislative elections and the redeployment of the administration to the northern regions.

50. The United Nations is developing an early recovery action plan to assist the Government in providing a rapid response to the post-crisis development challenges in northern Mali. The gradual return of the administration presents an opportunity to focus international assistance on reconstruction and development, beyond relief activities. It is expected that the implementation of early recovery programmes will address deficiencies in the delivery of essential services and support the authorities in stimulating the economy while promoting the creation of conditions for the safe return of displaced persons to their communities. The United Nations has also continued to support the restoration of social services in the northern regions, including by supporting health centres and nutritional units, vaccination campaigns, the repair of water distribution networks and the reopening of schools.

51. The United Nations has continued its assessment of historical and cultural heritage sites in Timbuktu and Gao with a view to their rehabilitation. Priority actions have been identified to safeguard the ancient manuscripts of Timbuktu. Work currently under way includes the annual replastering of the Djingareyber mosque in Timbuktu and an architectural survey of all the destroyed mausoleum sites. Through the efforts of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United Nations has developed training modules for military, police and civilian personnel on their responsibilities and duties with regard to the protection of the cultural heritage of Mali. The mine action service has also cooperated with United Nations partners in securing World Heritage Sites in Mali.

VII. Humanitarian situation

52. While a large number of Malians remain displaced by the conflict, the significant increase in returns has been encouraging. An estimated 509,000 people were forced to leave their homes because of the conflict in the north and sought shelter in central or southern Mali or in neighbouring countries. As at 16 September, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported a total of 171,000 Malian refugees in neighbouring countries and continued to undertake more detailed registration to generate precise data. As at 29 August, the Commission on Population Movements estimated that there were 333,000 internally displaced persons in Mali, the majority of whom live with family or friends in precarious conditions, relying on humanitarian aid and the solidarity of host communities that were already under considerable strain before the conflict started. Meanwhile, heavy flooding in Bamako in late August led to at least 34 deaths, and many others were injured or remain missing.

53. A continuing trend of spontaneous returns to northern Mali was noted during the reporting period. The International Organization for Migration estimates that as at mid-September, about 137,000 people had returned to their areas of origin in the Timbuktu and Gao regions. Efforts are under way to collect additional data to confirm returnee numbers and profiles in order to ensure appropriate responses to their immediate and future needs.

54. Conditions for the active promotion of the voluntary return of displaced populations with security and dignity have yet to be achieved in the northern regions. However, in view of the spontaneous occurrence of returns, humanitarian organizations have mobilized to provide basic material assistance to vulnerable populations in the areas of return in the context of the early recovery action plan (see para. 50).

55. Important needs remain to be covered in all sectors. At least 3.5 million Malians suffer from food insecurity, including 1.4 million who require immediate assistance. The situation is of particular concern in northern Mali, where an estimated 1.35 million people are affected by food insecurity, according to an emergency food security assessment conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme and their partners in August. Humanitarian access in the northern regions has improved but remains restricted in rural areas and in the Kidal region owing to the prevailing insecurity. Insecurity also continues to affect the economic systems and the livelihoods of the population, for example by limiting access to foodstuffs and agricultural inputs or by contributing to the loss of cattle and employment. The most vulnerable people have resorted to negative coping strategies, such as consuming or selling off seeds and other assets, thereby further eroding their resilience. The first nutritional survey carried out in conflict-affected areas since 2011 revealed a serious nutritional situation in the Gao region, in which the global acute malnutrition rate among children under 5 was 13.5 per cent. Overall, an estimated 660,000 children under 5 are at risk of malnutrition, including 210,000 who are suffering from severe acute malnutrition. Efforts by the United Nations to treat malnutrition and to provide assistance in the areas of health care, water and sanitation continue.

56. In July, the consolidated appeal process for Mali was revised upward to take into account the new needs identified by humanitarian partners after the military intervention at the beginning of 2013. As at 16 September, the 2013 consolidated appeal process for Mali had raised only $176 million (37 per cent) of the $477 million required. Additional resources are urgently needed in order to address the basic needs of millions of Malians who currently depend on humanitarian assistance for their survival and protection.

VIII. Establishment of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

57. Although MINUSMA is one of the most logistically challenging missions the United Nations has ever launched, encouraging progress towards its establishment has been achieved during the reporting period. This has included efforts to help MINUSMA contingents rehatted from AFISMA reach United Nations standards for personnel and equipment, as well as progress with the establishment of a mission headquarters in Bamako and presences at the regional level in Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal

and Mopti. Nonetheless, significant gaps still need to be filled in the authorized military and police strength of MINUSMA. The recruitment and deployment of civilian staff is ongoing.

A. Deployment of civilian, military and police personnel

58. On 1 July, MINUSMA, which until that date had focused on the civilian tasks transferred from the United Nations Office in Mali on 25 April, assumed responsibility for military and police personnel deployed under AFISMA following the transfer of authority. Following a ceremony in Bamako on that date, 6,103 military personnel, 20 individual police officers and 3 formed police units comprising 368 officers were rehatted and started receiving full support from MINUSMA at United Nations standards. An assessment of deployed contingent-owned equipment was conducted in August and September to identify critical shortfalls. The military contingents and formed police units have been given a grace period, ending 31 October, to reach United Nations standards in terms of contingent-owned equipment and personnel.

59. Prior to the rehatting, MINUSMA screened contingents to ensure their full compliance with United Nations human rights standards. Human rights screening will continue for all incoming contingents.

60. As at 16 September, MINUSMA troop strength stood at 5,208 following the withdrawal of one infantry battalion by a troop-contributing country. MINUSMA has five infantry battalions deployed in most key areas, including Tessalit, Aguelhok, Kidal, Gao, Ménaka and Ansongo in Sector East, and Gossi, Douentza, Sévaré, Timbuktu, Goundam and Diabaly in Sector West. A transport company from Côte d'Ivoire and an engineer construction company from Ghana are deployed in Bamako. In addition, a level-II hospital from Togo is deployed in Sévaré and a combat engineer company from Senegal is deployed in Gao.

61. Capabilities that still need to be generated in order for MINUSMA to reach its authorized strength include two infantry battalions, an airfield engineer company for the rehabilitation of the airstrips in Tessalit and Kidal, an information operations unit and a special forces company. Critical shortfalls also remain in military utility and armed helicopters. The achievement of the full operational capability required by the military component to perform all mandated tasks is expected to be delayed until additional enabling capabilities are generated.

62. As at 17 September, the MINUSMA police component comprised 56 individual police officers, 5 formed police units comprising 743 personnel and members of the standing police capacity. A total of 34 individual police officers are present in Bamako, while 22 are deployed in the northern regions. Two formed police units are deployed in Bamako and one each in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.

63. The Mission continued to strengthen its civilian presence in the Bamako, Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal regions, with a civilian staffing of 287 on the ground as at 17 September. The three regional offices in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal initiated operations, with civilian and uniformed personnel deploying progressively. The MINUSMA civilian component is focusing on supporting the political process, including negotiations with armed groups and preparations for the inclusive national dialogue process, as well as on the human rights, civilian protection, justice,

corrections, gender and child protection aspects of the mandate, as well as the wide range of support tasks required during the start-up phase of the Mission.

64. In order to raise awareness among the Malian population on the mandate and establishment of the Mission, MINUSMA has conducted an outreach campaign focused on promoting peaceful and credible elections and inclusive dialogue, as well as explaining the transition of AFISMA troops to MINUSMA. The Mission's leadership has engaged extensively with local media, especially radio stations, and conducted outreach visits to the north of the country to build confidence.

B. Support challenges

65. The transition of AFISMA troops to MINUSMA contingents on 1 July significantly increased the support requirements to be met by the Mission, particularly in terms of life support and other logistical needs, including food, water and fuel. The harsh operating environment, the large distances between population centres and the poor state of infrastructure place major constraints on operations in northern Mali and make MINUSMA heavily dependent on air assets. As a result, the generation of a rotary aviation fleet and capabilities for the management of airfield services and airport and runway rehabilitation, repair and maintenance in the north remain top priorities. Those capabilities are vital for the deployment of personnel, equipment and infrastructure, as well as for the sustainment and operations of the troops and the police and civilian components of the Mission.

66. A total of $44 million has been pledged or received for the Trust Fund in Support of AFISMA. Of that amount, $6 million is earmarked for and committed to humanitarian mine action. An initial shipment of equipment valued at $14 million has been sent to Mali and is being allocated to contingents that transitioned from AFISMA. A balance of $24 million is currently available to support the transitioned contingents and will be used to provide additional equipment and maintenance. The transitioned contingents were asked to meet United Nations standards for equipment and capability by 31 October 2013. Additional bilateral donations and equipment provided through the Trust Fund will complement the troop- and police-contributing countries' efforts to strengthen their capacity to undertake mandated activities.

67. The Trust Fund in Support of Peace and Security in Mali has received $7 million in mostly non-earmarked contributions, with a further $4.5 million expected to be received shortly. Funding has been used to support the cantonment of armed groups in Kidal. Equipment valued at $700,000 has been shipped to Kidal to support the establishment of three cantonment sites, including tents and generators. A pilot project to provide immediate life-support needs (food, water and fuel) and minor infrastructure renovations is being implemented in those sites for an initial two-month period at an estimated cost of $900,000.

C. Safety and security

68. Armed groups and crime pose the main threats to United Nations personnel in Mali. In order to enable programme delivery and ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel, premises and assets in the country, 75 security officers are deployed in Bamako, Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The United Nations security team in Mali is continuously conducting assessments of transportation routes and specific geographical areas to identify and address emerging security

threats. The team has reinforced security measures at the entrance to all United Nations premises and has recommended special residential and office security measures, including safe rooms, for all United Nations personnel. In addition, under the minimum operating security standards, personal protection equipment and other security equipment and armoured vehicles are required.

IX. International coordination

69. On 1 July, the Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali, which is chaired jointly by the African Union, ECOWAS and the United Nations, held its fifth meeting, in Bamako. The participants welcomed the signing of the preliminary agreement and stressed the need for continued international support for national efforts towards peace consolidation. They also encouraged the authorities to create an environment conducive to the holding of credible elections.

70. My Special Representative has continuously engaged with the diplomatic community to develop common messages and approaches to support the holding of peaceful and transparent elections. On 29 July, my Special Representative chaired a meeting to discuss the first round of elections with the heads of election observation missions, including those mandated by the African Union, the International Organization of la Francophonie, ECOWAS and the European Union. The participants agreed that the polls had been held in accordance with recognized international electoral standards.

71. My Special Representative began visits to countries neighbouring Mali to discuss issues of common concern, including security challenges. In this respect, he travelled to the Niger on 3 July, attended the forty-third ordinary session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Abuja on 17 and 18 July and travelled to Mauritania on 4 and 5 August to meet with the President, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. He also travelled to Algiers and N'Djamena on 9 and 11 September, respectively.

72. At the operational level, MINUSMA continued to liaise closely with Operation Serval, including by exchanging information. A technical agreement was signed on 1 July between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the French Ministry of Defence on "in extremis" support to be provided by Operation Serval to MINUSMA. Liaison arrangements have also been established with the European Union Training Mission.

X. Observations

73. The successful conduct of the presidential election, including in the northern regions, where the security situation had been precarious, is a remarkable achievement for which I commend the transitional authorities and the Malian people. The election is, however, only the first step on the long road towards the restoration of peace and stability in Mali. It provides an opportunity for Malians to engage in genuine national dialogue on the challenges facing their country and to collectively agree on the way forward to address the root causes of the crisis. I encourage all Malian actors, including northern communities and armed groups, to seize the moment and launch an inclusive national dialogue as soon as possible in

accordance with the transitional road map and the preliminary agreement to hold a presidential election and inclusive peace talks in Mali.

74. The signing of the preliminary agreement marked a vital step in the country's transition towards the full restoration of constitutional order and territorial integrity. In this regard, I commend the parties for their commitment and determination to peacefully resolve the crisis. I welcome the efforts by the ECOWAS Mediator, in close collaboration with the United Nations, the African Union, the European Union and key bilateral partners, which were critical to ensuring the success of the negotiations leading to the signing of the agreement.

75. The task of fully implementing the preliminary agreement rests primarily with its signatories and adherents, particularly the Government and the armed groups. The insecurity and persisting tensions in some areas of the northern regions, particularly in Kidal, remains a concern. I urge the parties to the agreement to desist from acts that could jeopardize the gains achieved so far. I call upon them to continue to refrain from acts of provocation and violence and to work together towards national reconciliation. The sustained engagement of the international community is crucial. In that regard, I congratulate both the Monitoring and Evaluation Committee and the Mixed Technical Commission on Security for progress made thus far in implementing the provisions of the ceasefire agreement, which includes the establishment of cantonment sites and the release of some prisoners as part of confidence-building measures. I urge MNLA, HCUA and MAA to resume their participation in those important mechanisms.

76. It will be also vitally important to forge genuine political consensus on the organization of the upcoming parliamentary and local elections, and I would urge the authorities and political parties to maintain their focus on this key challenge. In this regard, I call upon the authorities to ensure that outstanding technical issues are addressed in an inclusive manner to allow for the timely holding of those polls.

77. The launch of the activities of the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission is a sign of commitment by the Malian authorities to begin to address the root causes of the crisis. I encourage the authorities to reflect further on its mandate and composition in order to ensure the full support of all communities for its work. The international community should continue and strengthen its support for the efforts of the Malian people to foster dialogue and reconciliation.

78. The deployment of the local administration, Malian security and defence forces and MINUSMA, along with the presence of the French forces, has helped improve the security situation in the major northern towns. Insecurity, in particular clashes between Tuareg and Arab groups and the continued presence of armed groups, remains a serious concern, however. While the operational capabilities of the armed groups have been reduced, the attack on the Malian military camp in Timbuktu on 29 September and the discovery on 27 and 29 July of improvised explosive devices near Aguelhok have shown that they retain the capability to pose a significant threat. I encourage the Malian authorities and their partners to remain vigilant. I also call upon international partners to increase their support to the Malian forces to ensure that national capacity to proactively address the continued threat posed by extremist armed groups is built up.

79. I wish to commend the French forces for their vital contribution to the major combat operations against armed groups in early 2013. Their role, including in

support of the Malian forces, remains crucial. As the French forces begin their drawdown and MINUSMA builds up its capacity, it is important that the gains made thus far be consolidated. In this regard, it will be critical to bridge the Mission's gaps in terms of military and police capacities. I reiterate my request for support from all Member States, including the provision of rotary-wing aircraft for the generation of key enablers, as well as for the provision of support to help MINUSMA contingents meet United Nations standards by the end of October.

80. It is essential for the Government to accelerate the deployment of the administration in the north to improve the delivery of basic services, as well as to support initiatives for inter- and intra-community dialogue. In this regard, it is important that the authorities ensure the expeditious restoration of the rule of law and justice in the northern regions. In turn, this will facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and their reintegration into their communities without fear of reprisal, as well as promote social cohesion and respect for human rights.

81. While the situation is improving in the north, it is important to bear in mind that the crisis has affected all Malians, including those living in the southern part of the country. There is an ongoing food crisis, affecting more than 800,000 people, which needs urgently to be addressed. I appeal to the international community to help alleviate the suffering of the affected populations.

82. The inability of the national authorities to effectively address the chronic humanitarian crisis is a further reminder of the systemic weaknesses that have debilitated the Malian State and Government in recent years. The challenges are significant, and the population is eager to reap peace dividends. As the international community anticipates the successful completion of the electoral process, I call upon President Keita and his cabinet to address, as a matter of priority, critical governance challenges that would enable the State to resume effective functioning. These include institutional and security sector reforms, national dialogue, and reconciliation and justice. Equally important is the fight against corruption and organized crime and the need to strengthen accountability mechanisms. In turn, those measures would help to facilitate the disbursement of pledges made at the donors' conference held in May in Brussels, which is urgently needed to launch recovery and development programmes. In addition to longer-term programmes, early recovery activities are crucial in order for Malians to benefit from tangible peace dividends.

83. As the country moves forward, Malian actors and the international community need to reassess their relationship in order to address the problems that contributed to the crisis. I encourage international partners to establish, in consultation with the Malian authorities, a "new deal" that would ensure accountability while respecting national sovereignty.

84. The challenges facing the Sahel region are numerous. As we focus on supporting the stabilization of Mali, we must remain aware of the vulnerabilities of neighbouring countries. The Sahel region can be stabilized only through concerted national, regional and international efforts. In this regard, I reiterate my call to national, regional and international actors to support the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel.

85. In closing, I commend the Malian people and the authorities for their determination to restore constitutional order and national cohesion. I would like to express my appreciation to my Special Representative, Albert Gerard Koenders, for his leadership and steadfast support to Malians at this critical juncture. I would also like to extend my appreciation to bilateral partners and regional and multilateral organizations, in particular the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union, the International Organization of la Francophonie, the United Nations country team and non-governmental organizations, for their work in support of the people of Mali.

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Letter dated 26 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the communiqué of the session of the Council on Collective Security of the Collective Security Treaty Organization adopted in Sochi on 23 September 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 33, and as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

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Annex to the letter dated 26 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Communiqué of the session of the Council on Collective Security of the Collective Security Treaty Organization

The Council on Collective Security (hereinafter — "the Council") notes the positive momentum in the development of the collective security system of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in all its main fields of operation, and the establishment of the Organization as one of the fundamental instruments guaranteeing the security of the Collective Security Treaty Organization member States and stability in the area of collective security.

The Council notes with concern the escalation of international instability resulting from conflicts and crisis situations, especially in the Near East and Middle East, and in North Africa. It notes the possibility that new challenges and threats will emerge in the region and in the world as a whole, following the withdrawal in 2014 from Afghanistan of the main contingent of the International Security Assistance Force. It emphasizes the overriding need for general efforts, within the Collective Security Treaty Organization, to achieve peace and stability.

The Heads of State of the Collective Security Treaty Organization members consider it important to implement foreign policy cooperation, coordination and the development of common approaches to developments in the present international situation. In this context, it is all the more advisable for the Collective Security Treaty Organization member States to act in concert within the United Nations and other international forums.

The Council attaches fundamental importance to the prevention of external threats and outside interference, to the strengthening of joint efforts to counter international terrorism and extremism, the illicit trafficking of drugs and arms, illegal migration and trafficking in persons, and the use of information and communication technologies for unlawful purposes, including joint efforts of the type undertaken through the internationally recognized series of comprehensive preventive operations entitled "Kanal" ("Channel"), "Nelegal", and also "Proksi". The implementation of the decision to provide assistance to the Republic of Tajikistan in strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border is designed to make a substantive contribution to the resolution of these problems.

The Council attaches great significance to the formation of an effective collective response system for emergency situations, including man-made and natural disasters.

As part of the enhancement of military cooperation, and also increasing the combat potential of the troops and resources of the collective security system, it would be justified and timely to approve the main areas of development of military cooperation among the Collective Security Treaty Organization member States for the period up to 2020, to set up a military committee, to build up the Collective Security Treaty Organization collective operational response forces and supply them with modern weaponry and military and special technology. Through the conduct of a series of joint exercises entitled "Rubezh", "Vzaimodeistvie", "Nerushimoe

bratstvo", "Kobalt" and "Grom", the level of preparedness of the troops of Collective Security Treaty Organization member States and of resources involved has increased.

At the session, the commitment to further joint strengthening of the Organization's collective security system and the enhancement of its effectiveness was affirmed.

Sochi, 23 September 2013

United Nations S/2013/584

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 August 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representative of China on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 29 June 2013 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of China, stating that Mr. Liu Jieyi has been appointed representative of China on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

13-50177 (E) 071013

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United Nations S/2013/585

Security Council

Distr.: General
4 September 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the representative of the Republic of Korea on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials signed on 3 September 2013 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, stating that Mr. Oh Joon has been appointed representative of the Republic of Korea on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

13-49558 (E) 021013

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United Nations S/2013/586

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 October 2013
English
Original: French

Letter dated 2 October 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Mali to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Republic of Mali is deeply concerned at the recent wave of terrorist attacks that have taken place in the northern regions of Mali.

On 27 September 2013, unknown individuals launched two grenades at members of the National Guard, who were providing security to Banque Malienne de Solidarité in the town of Kidal.

On 28 September 2013, four terrorists carried out a suicide attack in the military camp in Timbuktu. Six people died in this cowardly attack, two civilians and the four terrorists. The explosion also caused significant damage to property.

On 29 September 2013, Kidal was again rocked by an explosion accidentally caused by a terrorist who was preparing to carry out a suicide attack. At the same time, armed men opened fire on soldiers of the national army, who managed to repel the attack.

This spate of terrorist attacks, undermining the process of open and inclusive dialogue to which the Government of the Republic of Mali has been resolutely committed since 6 September 2013, clearly shows that the fight against terrorism and organized crime in Mali is not over and that the security situation remains fragile throughout the Sahel region.

These multiple terrorist attacks also underscore the need for effective redeployment of the defence and security forces of Mali throughout its national territory, particularly in the northern regions with the support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013).

In response to this situation, the Government of the Republic of Mali urges the entire international community to remain actively engaged in support of Mali's counter-terrorism efforts, as indeed has been the case since the start of the Malian crisis.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sékou **Kassé**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

13-49886 (E) 041013 041013

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